Gordon Brown has survived three coup attempts. His party - which, from top to bottom, has people who doubt that the leader can win an election - did not remove him. Here's why.
• "Everyone" - among the plotters - agreed on the problem: Gordon Brown
• No-one agreed on the solution: who should replace him
• And in any case, few could see how to get from A to B
That, in a nutshell, was the problem with every plot to remove the PM. It is the reason I have been deeply sceptical that anything would come of them (leading me, let me confess, to mock the idea of a leadership coup just minutes before it began!)
Gordon Brown has the full-blooded and enthusiastic support of only a handful of members of his Cabinet. However, the Brown sceptics feared that he would fight all the way any attempt to remove him - even at a very high cost to his party, such as triggering an instant general election. Many were frightened of the divisions that would created if there were no clear replacement for Brown, while believing that they could not have another unelected leader
Labour's rules, , meant that a backbench challenge like the one which precipitated the fall of Margaret Thatcher required over 70 MPs to go public with their revolt - a number which proved impossible.
A group of backbench rebels, led by the likes of Charles Clarke and Barry Sheerman, tried to surmount these obstacles by seeking a proxy for a head-on leadership challenge. They considered mounting a challenge for the chairmanship of the Parliamentary Labour Party; voting against the Queen's Speech and organising letters from backbenchers - like those used to destabilise Tony Blair - demanding a change of leader.
The rebels - aided by former Blairite ministers - talked to those in the Cabinet to assess their mood. They came away with the view, rightly or wrongly, that senior figures - in particular, Foreign Secretary David Miliband and deputy party leader Harriet Harman - feared certain defeat at the polls if Gordon Brown stayed at the helm. Both though were said to be very cautious about a challenge and to believe that "overwhelming force" would be necessary to remove the prime minister.
The rebels also believed that other senior figures would be prepared to sit on their hands and not come to the PM's aid in the event of a coup attempt. The Chancellor Alastair Darling has been bruised by his dealings with his Downing Street neighbour. The Defence Secretary Bob Ainsworth has clashed with the PM. What's more, Peter Mandelson (First Secretary of State et cetera) had fallen out with his boss over political strategy and the allocation of top jobs in Europe.
Some argue that the rebels' intelligence was faulty and that they believed what they wanted to believe - see Michael White's account in the Guardian, . Certainly, Jack Straw, Jim Murphy and Douglas Alexander - who were named as possible Cabinet supporters of a putsch - insist that whatever their doubts and misgivings, they were not ever ready to assist in this latest coup attempt.
The rebels decided that any new move to remove the prime minister needed to be fronted by new faces - hence the former ministers Patricia Hewitt and Geoff Hoon took the lead. They wanted a mechanism that did not force Cabinet members to say instantly whether they would back or sack Gordon Brown - hence the call for a secret ballot on his leadership.
The plotters feared detection, so they dared risk neither meeting as a group nor letting one figure contact each possible Cabinet dissident. Thus, no one person was in control. The plot was dependent on a chain of Chinese whispers about who thought what and who would do what in which circumstances.
Some Cabinet ministers had been talking to each other - and, indeed, to journalists - for some time about whether and how to remove their leader. They too, though, never met as a group. Senior figures did not trust each other enough to discuss their plans candidly.
The result was that although the rebels hoped that once they triggered a crisis a group of ministers would follow their lead, they actually had no firm assurances to that effect - and no minister did, of course, resign.
There was, though, a long delay on Wednesday before senior minister publicly rejected the revolt and backed - albeit less than enthusiastically - Gordon Brown. In that time, the prime minister had a meeting with Jack Straw and Harriet Harman, who demanded a widening of his leadership circle and less reliance on the "Ed And Peter Show". He also met his Chancellor Alastair Darling, who has long been frustrated by the mixed messages sent out by his boss about the need to cut spending to cut the deficit.
As planned, this turned out to be the moment when Labour had to decide whether to back or sack Gordon Brown - and whether intentionally or not, the Cabinet has ended up backing him.
When the Cabinet met this morning, members looked at each other aware that many of them do not believe that they can win the election with Gordon Brown as their leader. Their task now is to prove themselves wrong.